L’humain produit des discours sur le monde : mythologies, religions, mysticismes, philosophies, science. La majorité de ses discours sont de nature transcendante. À la suite d’un clarification conceptuelle fondée sur les notions de réflexion et de discours général, la philosophie apparaît comme un dis- cours général transcendant parmi d’autres ; d’où l’échec de celle-ci à rendre compte du monde et de la science ; d’où la nécessité de disposer d’un discours général non transcendant, un discours général proprement scientifique, une métascience. (...) À la lumière des frontières ainsi redéfinies, il sera proposé de fonder la métascience sur une interprétation de l’oeuvre de Mario Bunge. Cette interprétation se fonde sur un ensemble de postulats généraux aux- quels Mario Bunge adhère et tenus pour acquis par les scientifiques. Il est proposé que soutenir un tel ensemble de postulats sans les problématiser à la manière des philosophes, fait en sorte que la pensée de Bunge ne relève plus de la philosophie. (shrink)

Les débats sur les liens qui uniraient la science à l’ontologie sont très actifs en philosophie contemporaine, et, en fait, ils ont toujours été présents. Malgré les diverses positions philosophiques sur le sujet, elles admettent toutes l’existence d’une réalité métaphysique. À l’opposé, la métascience soutient qu’une telle réalité n’existe pas. Ce second numéro de Mɛtascience présente sept articles sur douze qui ont comme fil conducteur soit l’ontologie métascientifique soit l’ontologie bungéenne.

L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontologiques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élaboration d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne diffèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’ontologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche pas à représenter (...) des objets étrangers au monde que nous habitons et aux sciences qui l’étudient, et par conséquent elle n’a pas besoin de facultés ni de méthodes spéciales pour mener à bien ses recherches. L’ontologie métascientifique est un discours général scientifique sur le monde parce que conçue par et pour les sciences. (shrink)

En 1982, John Wettersten, dans un texte à propos du malaise et de la frustration qu’on peut ressentir à la lecture de l’oeuvre de Bunge, tentait de comprendre pourquoi son oeuvre n’est pas consi- dérée comme une alternative aux travaux d’autres philosophes. La réponse proposée par Wettersten a trait au problème d’acquisition de la connaissance. Si la connaissance est contextuelle, relative à un cadre de pensée, comment pouvons- nous alors évaluer rationnellement ce cadre de pensée lui-même ? Wettersten identifie deux (...) tendances : ou bien on soutient que les cadres de pensée sont choisis arbitrairement, ce qui mène au rela- tivisme, ou bien on soutient qu’il n’existe qu’un seul cadre de pensée immuable, ce qui mène au dogmatisme. (shrink)

Nous examinons l’idée selon laquelle il existerait une sous-discipline en phi-losophie des sciences, la philosophie dans les sciences, dont les chercheurs utili-seraient des outils philosophiques pour avancer des solutions à des problèmes scientifiques. Nous proposons plutôt l’idée que ces outils sont des outils épisté-miques, cognitifs ou intellectuels standards, à l’œuvre dans toute activité ration-nelle, et, par conséquent, ces chercheurs se consacrent à la recherche scienti-fique ou métascientifique.

Ce premier numéro de Mεtascience rend un hommage posthume à Mario Bunge, décédé en février 2020. Ce n’est pas la première fois, et certainement pas la dernière, que des penseurs rendent hommage à Mario Bunge ou que son oeuvre fait l’objet d’une étude, à juste titre d’ailleurs, car l’homme est un humaniste et l’oeuvre digne héritière des Lumières. Bunge a contribué de façon significative à un très grand nombre de disciplines : physique, philosophie, sociologie, psychologie, sciences cognitives. Ce numéro est (...) aussi une façon de faire connaître sa pensée à un lectorat francophone. (shrink)

Nous expliquerons pourquoi le Treatise on Basic Philosophy est une œuvre mé-tascientifique et non pas philosophique. On soutiendra ensuite que cette métas-cience s’inscrit dans un long processus de naturalisation de la pensée qui débute à la fin du Moyen Âge pour donner naissance à la pensée scientifique de l’étude du monde. La naturalisation prend la forme chez Bunge d’une naturalisation de la pensée générale qui permet de remplacer le discours général philosophique par le discours général scientifique. Finalement, cette naturalisation du (...) discours général ne doit pas être confondue avec les projets de naturalisation de la philo-sophie, notamment un des projets de la métaphysique scientifique ou naturali-sée connu sous le nom de réalisme structurel ontique. (shrink)

Genealogies in philosophy can be tricky and even a little dangerous. Lines of influence and inheritance run much more linearly on paper than in reality. I am often reminded of Robert Frost's "Mending Walls" and the attention that must be paid to what is being walled in and what is being walled out. In other words, William James and Emmanuel Levinas are not natural conversation partners. I have always read James as a fellow traveler of Edmund Husserl, and placed both (...) in a line of thought that might share Franz Brentano and Wilhelm Dilthey as forebears. In this genealogy, Levinas appears with an asterisk, or after one. Maurice Natanson described Husserlian phenomenology as an elderly grandparent who comes down to dinner just a little bit too early, making everyone uncomfortable. Seating Levinas next to James brings to mind some similar scene. What basic premises or positions do James and Levinas share? Is Levinas a Jamesian pragmatist? Is he a radical empiricist? Does James offer an ethics that parallels or even complements Levinas's rigorous ethical phenomenology? (shrink)

While naturalism is used in positive senses by the tradition of analytical philosophy, with Ludwig Wittgenstein its best example, and by the tradition of phenomenology, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty its best exemplar, it also has an extremely negative sense on both of these fronts. Hence, both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in their basic thrusts adamantly reject reductionistic naturalism. Although Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology rejects the naturalism Husserl rejects, he early on found a place for the “truth of naturalism.” In a parallel way, Wittgenstein (...) accepts a certain positive sense of naturalism, while rejecting Quine’s kind of naturalism. It is the aim of this paper to investigate the common ground in the views of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty regarding the naturalism that they each espouse and that which they each reject. (shrink)

CETTE THESE SE VEUT UNE CONTRIBUTION A LA COMPREHENSION DE LA DERNIERE PHILOSOPHIE DE MERLEAU-PONTY, EN PRENANT COMME FIL CONDUCTEUR LA NOTION D'INSTITUTION. NOUS ESSAYONS D'ABORD DE DELIMITER LE CHAMP D'INTERROGATION DE LA NOTION D'INSTITUTION, TELLE QU'ELLE EST PRESENTEE DANS SES DEUX PREMIERS OUVRAGES. DEUXIEMEMENT, LA DESCRIPTION DE QUATRE ORDRES DE L'INSTITUTION SYMBOLIQUE (ANIMALITE ET VIE; STYLE ARTISTIQUE; LANGUE ET IDEALITE; SYSTEME SOCIAL) QUE NOUS NOUS EFFORCONS DE RECONSTITUER A L'AIDE DES MANUSCRITS INEDITS CONDUIT A DEVOILER LES MOTIVATIONS DE LA (...) RADICALISATION DE LA QUESTION PHENOMENOLOGIQUE. ENFIN, NOTRE PROBLEMATIQUE SE PRESENTE DANS LE DERNIER OUVRAGE COMME UN PROJET DE L'INSTITUTION DE LA PHILOSOPHIE ELLE-MEME. CE PROJET A SA PORTEE HISTORIQUE, SE PROPOSANT DE METTRE EN EVIDENCE LES MOMENTS FECONDS DANS L'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE, DE MANIERE A LEVER LES DIFFICULTES DE L'ONTOLOGIE ACTUELLE. (shrink)

S'étonnant qu'un simple physicien sache traiter des rapports de la physique et de la métaphysique, Edmond Domet de Vorges s'était demandé si Pierre Duhem n'avait pas bénéficié de l'aide de quelque théologien dans l'élaboration de son articulation de ces deux disci­plines. Faisant suite à cette question très perti­nente, cet article liste d'abord les intellectuels catholiques qui étaient en relation avec Duhem avant la publication, en 1893, de son article Physique et métaphysique et qui auraient effec­tivement pu l'aider à concevoir une (...) telle articulation. Se con­sacrant ensuite spécifiquement à l'un d'entre eux, à savoir Maurice Blondel, il étudie les similitudes et divergences existant entre les pensées du physicien bordelais et du philosophe d'Aix pour conclure que Blondel ne peut pas être celui qui aurait inspiré Duhem. À l'appui de cette conclusion, il fait notamment état d'une lettre inédite adressée par Duhem à Ambroise Gar­deil et dans laquelle celui-ci porte un jugement sévère à l'en­droit de son «pauvre ami» Blondel. ––– One might be surprised to find that a simple physician could be able explain with clarity the subtle relationship between physics and metaphysics. It is with this question in mind that Edmond Domet de Vorges asked himself if it might not have been with the aid of theologians that Pierre Duhem was able to find and express his subtle articulation between the two disciplines. Following in the footsteps of this pertinent question, this article begins by listing the catholic intellectuals who were acquain­tances of Pierre Duhem before the publication in 1893 of “Physique et métaphysique”, who may have been able to help him arrive at the relationship between the two sciences expressed in his publication. This line of questioning is followed by a specific study of one of these men, namely Maurice Blondel. The similarities and differences in the opinions of the physician from Bordeaux and the philosopher from Aix are explored with the resulting conclusion that Blondel could not have been he who inspired Duhem. This conclusion can be confirmed by a previously unpublished letter from Duhem to Ambroise Gardeil which contains a very severe judgement with regards to his “poor friend” Blondel. (shrink)

El trabajo analiza la estructura de L'Action (1893) del filósofo francés Maurice Blondel en tres niveles diferentes según el modelo de la configuración triádica de la temporalidad. El primer nivel está implícito en la analítica de la acción llevada a cabo en la Introduction a la obra; el segundo nivel se identifica con el análisis de la pasividad del primer momento de la cuarta parte; el tercer nivel abarca la obra considerada en su globalidad, extendiéndose a la problemática del (...) fenómeno de la acción, de la demostración del único ser necesario y de la alternativa de la acción. El análisis pretende demostrar que las dimensiones antecedente, presente y adveniente de la temporalidad están a la base de la comprensión de esta obra blondeliana. (shrink)

This is a review (in French) of the French translation and edition of D.M. Armstrong's Universals: An Opiniated Introduction.

(Back Cover:) « La pensée métaphysique renaîtra demain. Ce sont des savants qui ont le goût et le sens de la pensée conduite jusqu’au terme de ses exigences internes, et des philosophes initiés aux sciences expérimentales qui, en commun, la feront. » L’œuvre de Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) illustre parfaitement cette recherche de la métaphysique d’un monde en devenir, qui sait écouter et se modeler sur la transformation – la métamorphose – promise à une Création finalisée. Le trait commun aux exposés (...) ici présentés sous forme définitive a été cette recherche autour d’une pensée qui renouvelle de l’intérieur la métaphysique en réalisant le vœu de Bergson qu’elle devienne « auscultatrice », que l’énigme que pose l’homme face à son origine et sa destinée ne soit pas recouverte par une pensée qui se perdrait dans la description des choses ou dans l’esprit de système, mais qui non plus n’irait se recroqueviller sur elle-même, en narrant sa propre expérience subjective sous le mode de la déréliction. Claude Tresmontant a su penser l’être en genèse, et il a cherché à renouveler la question de l’existence de Dieu, en en transformant la problématique en dialogue avec les sciences contemporaines. À ce goût de l’être dont les sciences ont renouvelé l’approche, il a également voulu infuser un « supplément d’âme », en repensant la réalité de la création et l’horizon de la cause finale, toujours à partir de la nature ultimement théologique de la réponse à la question « qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » Contributeurs : Yves Tourenne, Philippe Gagnon, Fabien Revol, Brunor, Frédéric Crouslé, Bertrand Souchard, Emmanuel Gabellieri. Table of Contents: Note Liminaire (Ph. Gagnon) - 7 En quoi la pensée de Claude Tresmontant nous stimule-t-elle encore ? Hommage et critique (Y. Tourenne) - 13 L’imbrication de la preuve de Dieu et de la cosmologie chez Tresmontant représente-t-elle une preuve ? (Ph. Gagnon) - 27 L’usage apologétique de la philosophie de Tresmontant dans les Indices pensables de Brunor (F. Revol) - 49 Réponse à Fabien Revol (Brunor) - 77 Qu’est-ce qui cloche dans la théologie de Claude Tresmontant ? (Fr. Crouslé) - 85 Les métaphysiques principales de Claude Tresmontant : la foi biblique est-elle à part de la raison philosophique grecque ? (B. Souchard) - 109 Maurice Blondel et Claude Tresmontant (E. Gabellieri) - 123 La vision informationnelle de Tresmontant, surtout en référence au problème de l’âme (Ph. Gagnon) - 133. (shrink)

Every idealist believes himself to have rational grounds for the faith that somewhere, and in some world, and at some time, the ideal will triumph, so that a survey, a divine synopsis of all time, somehow reveals the lesson of all sorrow, the meaning of all tragedy, the triumph of the spirit. But it is not ours to say, in the world in which we at present have to live from one day to another, and to follow the fortunes of (...) man from one newspaper to another,--when and how the true revelation of the world's meaning is faced and[ found. The Basic Writings of Josiah Royce, Vol. II, p. 1146.]. (shrink)

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERPOSITION. The need for a quantum theory Classical mechanics has been developed continuously from the time of Newton and applied to an ...

This volume discusses the ideas of six leading thinkers of the French Enlightenment: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Holbach, and Condorcet. A general introduction surveys the political theories of the Enlightenment, setting them in the context of the political realities of 18th-century France. The first book of its kind on the subject, Philosophers and Pamphleteers brings a welcome, new perspective to the study of French political thought during a fascinating historical era.

El presente texto de Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) apareció por primera vez en una traducción al italiano de Guido Neri bajo el título “II nome Berlino” [El nombre Berlín], publicado en 1964 en la revista literaria dirigida por Elio Vittorini e Italo Calvino Il menabó 7, año 6, pp. 121-25. El texto original en francés se extravió y, con la autorización del propio Blanchot, Hélène Jelen y Jean-Luc Nancy tradujeron la versión italiana al francés para publicarla en 1983 como “Le (...) Nom de Berlin” en una edición bilingüe. Desde entonces, la versión francesa ha sido reimpresa múltiples veces: en Cafe 3 (1983), 43-6; Berlin, collection Libération, 4 (1989); y Po&sie 52 (1990), 6-8. El texto fue finalmente republicado con su nombre original en francés, es decir, “Berlin” para la publicación de la traducción cuatrilingüe francés, inglés, ruso y alemán) aparecida en 1994 en MLN, Vol. 109, No. 3, German Issue (Apr.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 345-355. Se ha decidido traducir este texto también en lengua hispana por su innegable actualidad y peculiar claridad. En él no se trata exclusivamente sobre la realidad política, económica y lingüística de Berlín (o de Alemania) durante la Guerra Fría. Las reflexiones de Blanchot permanecen tan vigentes como el fenómeno que aquí decide enfrentar en sus múltiples aspectos: los fundamentos mismos de la política y el Estado en la modernidad. Para esta primera traducción al castellano del texto se ha tomado como referencia la versión de Jelen y Nancy antes mencionada. (shrink)

Human produce discourses on the world: mythologies, religions, mysticisms, philosophies, science. The majority of those discourses are transcendent in nature. Following a conceptual clarification based on the notions of reflection and general discourse, philosophy appears as a transcendent general discourse among others; hence the failure of the latter to account for the world and science; hence the need for a non-transcendent general discourse, a properly scientific general discourse, a metascience. In light of these redefined boundaries, it will be proposed to (...) base metascience on an interpretation of Mario Bunge’s work. This interpretation is based on a set of general postulates that Mario Bunge adheres to and taken for granted by scientists. It is proposed that supporting such a set of postulates without problematizing them in the manner of the philosophers, makes Bunge’s thinking no longer philosophical. (shrink)

In a 1995 interview, contemporary American composer John Zorn stated: ‘I got involved in music because of fi lm […] There’s a lot of fi lm elements in my music’ (Duckworth, 1995, p. 451). Scholars and critics have since widely noted these cinematic elements, with emphasis being placed on Zorn’s genre of so-called ‘fi le card compositions’. Whilst these studies have primarily concentrated on how the arrangement of sound blocks – the disjointed segments of Zorn’s compositions – can be compared (...) to cinematic montage, this article instead focusses on how sound blocks suggest the visual aspects of cinema. To delve deeper into the visuo-cinematic qualities of Zorn’s fi le card compositions, an idealised cinematic listener will be constructed, aided by various psychological, semiotic, philosophical and fi lm theories. I will suggest that a listener occupying a hypnogogic state projects moving images, akin to those of cinema, onto what Bernard Lewin fi rst called a ‘dream screen’. These projections occur due to intertextual associations made between fi le card compositions and the artistic fi gures to whom they are dedicated. These images combine with the sounds that brought them into being to form an audio-visual diegesis, which can be considered a type of half-imagined fi lm. The cinematic listener then actively draws out of this diegesis a narrative, via the semi-conscious process Boris Eikhenbaum called ‘inner speech’. I will conclude by giving some broader justifi cation for the methodology that brought this cinematic listener into being and suggest how the cinematic listener may be further utilised to provide musical analyses for fi le card works. (shrink)

While the consequences of mathematically-based software, algorithms and strategies have become ever wider and better appreciated, ethical reflection on mathematics has remained primitive. We review the somewhat disconnected suggestions of commentators in recent decades with a view to piecing together a coherent approach to ethics in mathematics. Calls for a Hippocratic Oath for mathematicians are examined and it is concluded that while lessons can be learned from the medical profession, the relation of mathematicians to those affected by their work is (...) significantly different. There is something to be learned also from the codes of conduct of cognate but professionalised quantitative disciplines such as engineering and accountancy, as well as from legal principles bearing on professional work. We conclude with recommendations that professional societies in mathematics should sponsor an (international) code of ethics, institutional mission statements for mathematicians and syllabuses of ethics courses for incorporation into mathematics degrees. (shrink)

Authors' affiliation: Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics & Management, Université Libre de Bruxelles; 50 Avenue Franklin D. Roosevelt, B-1050, Bruxelles, Belgium. ... Journal: Economic Studies, Volume 44, Number 9, Serial Number 316. ... Publisher: Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences – Vietnam Institute of Economics. ... Suggested citation: Farber, A. & Vuong, QH (2004) “New empirical results on anomalies and herd behaviors: Vietnam stock market 2000-2004,” Economic Studies.

Article 8 of the African Aspirations for 2063 stipulates that the African people are confident that their countries have the ability and competence to realize or accomplish their full potential in development, culture, and peace. The vast majority of countries in Africa have worked toward establishing flourishing, inclusive, successful and prosperous societies by eradicating any forms of violation of children’s rights (African Union Commission, 2015). Nevertheless, violation of children’s rights remains present in most developing countries including the country of Cameroon. (...) This research aims to explore the forms of violation of children’s rights having a dramatic incident in school attendance in the Kadey Division of Cameroon, East Region of Cameroon. This research work is inductive, values bias and uses the grounded theory of the qualitative method approach. 15 participants have been selected from 3 major focused groups of different stakeholders in the Kadey Division, East Region of Cameroon. The theoretical saturation code was used to explain the relevance of the sample size. Data were examined using the open, axial, and selective coding processes. The results were tested for internal and external validity based on credibility, dependability, conformability, and transferability consideration. The philosophical focused on subjectivism ontology and interpretivism perspective. The study is an investigative case study model. The study showed that the forms of violation of children’s rights in the Kadey division include the recruitment and use of children, the denial of humanitarian access, the sexual violence against children and the killing and hurting of children. This study encourages school leaders in the Kadey Division to acknowledge that schools are not meant to function apart from the local community. Promoting strong collaborative work ethics between the major educational stakeholders may help prevent and reduce violence against children within and outside the school milieu and therefore duplicate school attendance. (UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia, 2016). (shrink)

There is a prima facie conflict between the values of love and autonomy. How can we bind ourselves to a person and still enjoy the fruits of self-determination? This chapter argues that the solution to this conflict lies in recognizing that love is the basis of autonomy: one must love a person in order to truly appreciate their autonomy. To make this case, this chapter defends a minimalist account of love, according to which love is an agreeable sensation that is (...) experienced when considering the existence of another person. On this view, the lover does not desire anything from the beloved but works to attend to their presence. Love, then, puts us in a position to appreciate the beloved in their particular way of being. By accepting the presence of the beloved we gain a sense of their autonomy. The roots of this account of love are found in the writings of Damaris Cudworth Masham. This chapter draws on the work of Kieran Setiya, David Velleman, and Kyla Ebels-Duggan to elaborate on and defend Masham’s views. (shrink)

This is the introduction of issue 1 of Mɛtascience. -/- This first issue of Mεtascience is a posthumous tribute to Mario Bunge, who died in February 2020. This is not the first time, and certainly not the last, that thinkers pay homage to Mario Bunge or that his work is the subject of study, and rightly so, because the man is a humanist and the work worthy heiress of the Enlightenment. Bunge has made a significant contribution to a wide range (...) of disciplines: physics, philosophy, sociology, psychology, cognitive sciences. This issue is also a way to make his thoughts known to a French-speaking readership. (shrink)

Building on theoretical insights and rich experimental data of our preprints, we present here new theoretical and experimental results in three interrelated approaches to the Collatz problem and its generalizations: algorithmic decidability, random behavior, and Diophantine representation of related discrete dynamical systems, and their cyclic and divergent properties.

If you utter sentence (1) ‘Obama was born in 1961’ now, you say something true about the past. Since the past will always be such that the year 1961 has the property of being a time in which Obama was born, it seems impossible that could ever be false in a future context of utterance. We shall consider the case of a sentence about the past exactly like (1), but which was true when uttered a few years ago and is (...) no longer true now. On this basis, we shall conclude that the past has changed. (shrink)

[This is the complete issue of the second issue of Mɛtascience] -/- This second issue of the journal Mεtascience continues the char acterization of this new branch of knowledge that is metasci ence. If it is new, it is not in a radical sense since Mario Bunge practiced it in an exemplary way, since logical positivists were accused of practicing only a mere metascience, since scientists have always practiced it implicitly, and since some philosophers no longer practice philosophy but rather (...) metascience, but without characterizing it or theorizing it, that is, without realizing that they have abandoned one general discourse for another. The novelty therefore lies in this aware ness that a general discourse without philosophy is possible: a scien tific general discourse. The twelve contributions gathered in this volume illustrate the metascientific approach to knowledge of the world as well as to knowledge of knowledge of the world, that is, science. And like Bunge’s project, they are neither part of the analytical movement nor the continental movement in philosophy. We will read here studies about the Bungean system, some applications of Bungean thought, some metascientific contributions, and some reflections around meta science. Among metascientific disciplines, ontology occupies a prominent place in this issue of Mεtascience. Metascience differs from philoso phy in its rejection of the fundamental philosophical distinction be tween appearance and reality. Metascientific ontology therefore does not postulate the existence of any metaphysical reality. But metasci entific ontology, no more than philosophical ontology, is a factual sci ence. The first, because it studies scientific constructs and not concrete objects, the second, because it is interested in transcendent or meta physical objects. (shrink)

[This is the full issue of the first issue of Mɛtascience] -/- This inaugural issue of the journal Mεtascience is also a special issue since it pays tribute to Mario Bunge (1919-2020) to high light his contribution to knowledge and our filiation with his thought. Mario Bunge's project is part of the humanist and scientific tradition of the Enlightenment. At the end of his intellectual journey, he wrote more than 150 books and 540 articles or chapters, including translations into several (...) languages. The work covers almost all branches of philosophy, from ontology to ethics, semantics, episte mology, methodology, praxeology and axiology, as well as a large number of scientific disciplines, ranging from physics to sociology, chemistry, biology and psychology. Without a doubt, Bunge's mag num opus is the Treatise on Basic Philosophy in nine volumes (1974- 1989). The six contributions gathered here come from authors from differ ent backgrounds. Like Bunge's project, they are neither part of the an alytic or continental movement in philosophy. The reader will find studies on the Bungean system, applications of Bungean thought, re flections and testimonies, and metascientific contributions. From the point of view of metascience as theorized in these pages, Bunge is the last of the philosophers and the first metascientific. He kept from philosophy the idea of a complete system that would inte grate semantics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, axiology and praxe ology, but he refused to problematize scientific knowledge in a tradi tional way. The result is surprising: even by accepting science as it is, he finds room for questioning. May Mεtascience be a place of questioning and deployment of the approach designed by Mario Bunge. (shrink)

Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its objectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the world as known through the sciences, that their objects of study are scientific concepts, and that their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not seek to represent non-concrete objects (...) alien to the world we inhabit and to the sciences that study it, and therefore does not need special faculties and methods to carry out its research. Metascientific ontology is a general scientific discourse on the world because it was designed by and for the sciences. (shrink)

We examine the idea that there is a sub-discipline in philosophy of science, phi-losophy in science, whose researchers use philosophical tools to advance solu-tions to scientific problems. Rather, we propose that these tools are standard epistemic, cognitive, or intellectual tools at work in all rational activity, and therefore these researchers engage in scientific or metascientific research.

Debates about the links between science and ontology are very active in contemporary philosophy, and, in fact, they have always been present. Despite the various philosophical positions on the subject, they all admit the existence of a metaphysical reality. In contrast, metascience holds that such a reality does not exist. This second issue of Mɛtascience presents seven out of twelve articles that have as a common thread either the metascientific ontology or the Bungean ontology.

On 4th of August 2020, the Lebanese capital and port city, Beirut, was rocked by a massive explosion that has killed hundreds and injured thousands more, ravaging the heart of the city’s nearby downtown business district and neighbouring housing areas, where more than 750,000 people live. The waterfront neighbourhood and a number of dense residential neighbourhoods in the city’s eastern part were essentially flattened. Lebanese Government officials believe that the blast was caused by around 2,700 tonnes of ammonium nitrate stored (...) near the city’s cargo port without proper control for six years. -/- The disaster devastating Beirut’s port and city shows the latent danger of safe storage of potentially dangerous goods in modern ports, particularly ones located close to the heart of the city. The huge blast tore through major grain silos, stoking fears of shortages in a nation that imports nearly all its food and is already reeling from economic crisis. As the WFP (World Food Programme) said in a statement: the blast will “exacerbate the grim economic and food-security situation.” The Beirut blast also reminds us of the importance of ports in the contemporary globalized world. It calls our attention to safety and security, of governance and collaboration between port and city or region and of accessibility to the hinterland. What do local governments and port cities need to do to enhance the safety and security issues in port terminals? Or, to put it differently, how do we reconcile this challenge between the ports we need to feed us, serve us, provide us with medicines, equipment, etc. and the ports that threatens us? (shrink)

This is the presentation of issue 1 of Mɛtascience. -/- More than any other philosopher, Mario Bunge is unclassifiable. In 1982 John Wettersten wrote about the discomfort and frustration that one might feel when reading Bunge’s work. He was trying to understand why his work was not seen as an alternative to the work of other philosophers. Wettersten’s answer relates to the problem of knowledge acquisition. If knowledge is contextual, relative to a frame of thought, how can we then rationally (...) evaluate this frame of thought itself? Wettersten identifies two tendencies: either one maintains that frames of thought are chosen arbi- trarily, which leads to relativism, or one maintains that there is only one immutable frame of thought, which leads to dogmatism. (shrink)

We will explain why the Treatise on Basic Philosophy is a metascientific work and not a philosophical one. We will then argue that this meta-science is part of a long process of naturalization of thought that begins at the end of the Middle Ages to give birth to the scientific thought of the study of the world. For Bunge, naturalization takes the form of the naturalization of the general thought which makes it possible to replace philosophical general discourse with scientific (...) gen-eral discourse. Finally, this naturalization of general discourse should not be con-fused with the projects of naturalization of philosophy, in particular one of many projects of scientific or naturalized metaphysics known as ontic structural real-ism. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

We extend Langdon Winner's idea that artifacts have politics into the realm of mathematics. To do so, we first provide a list of examples showing the existence of mathematical artifacts that have politics. In the second step, we provide an argument that shows that all mathematical artifacts have politics. We conclude by showing the implications for embedding ethics into mathematical curricula. We show how acknowledging that mathematical artifacts have politics can help mathematicians design better exercises for their mathematics students.

Our thesis is that proprioception is not a sixth sense distinct from the sense of touch, but a part of that tactile (or haptic) sense. The tactile sense is defined as the sense whose direct intentional objects are macroscopic mechanical properties. We first argue (against D. Armstrong, 1962; B. O'Shaughnessy 1989, 1995, 1998 and M. Martin, 1992, 1993,1995) that the two following claims are incompatible : (i) proprioception is a sense distinct from touch; (ii) touch is a bipolar modality, that (...) intrinsically has both a subjective-bodily pole and objective pole. We then argue that the bipolarity of touch should be preferred over the introduction of a sui generis sense of the body. We try to revive Aristotle suggestion according to which the body is the tactile medium (like the air for sight). Since this medium is constantly changing its shape, we need some specific channel of information about its state : proprioception, functionally defined, is that part of touch which informs us about the state of this changing tactile medium. Though muscular and articular receptors are usually dedicated to inform us about the mechanical properties of the tactile media, and the skin receptors about the mechanical properties of the tactile objects, this is not essentially so. In weighting or wielding experiments we access the weight of external objects even when skin sensitivity is absent; in prosthetic touch, the skin receptors play the role usually assigned to muscle and articular receptors, namely to inform us about the mechanical state of the tactile medium. So proprioception, anatomically defined, can play both the role of informing us about the tactile medium, or about the tactile objects. That other sensory modalities also rely on proprioceptive information should be understood in terms of cross-modal dependencies: of sight, hearing, smell, taste...on touch. (shrink)

This article discusses the rationality principle, especially in Popper's version, on the occasion of a commentary of Maurice Lagueux's book, Rationality and Explanation in Economics (2010).

It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...) would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. This suggests we should reject our ordinary conception of how to make this life-changing decision, and raises general questions about how to rationally approach important life choices. (shrink)

The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.

While the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty remained engaged with artistic creation throughout his entire work, which continues to inspire artists today in manifold ways, no systematic and artistically inclusive study of this dimension of his thought has existed so far. Du sensible à l’œuvre fills this gap by offering not only an in-depth study of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthesiology and aesthetics by international Merleau-Ponty scholars spanning three generations, but also a rich selection of essays by art critics and theorists who assess (...) the impact of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy on their own artistic fields, including cinema, music, literature, film, dance, and installation art. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)